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STATE OF UTAH, : 
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KENNETH GLENN ROBERTS, : Case No. 910164 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
The parties agree that criminal defendants must be allowed 
a meaningful opportunity to present complete defenses to the 
criminal charges against them. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 
690 (1986). See also opening brief of Appellant at 7-8 (same); 
brief of Appellee at 4-5 (same). 
The parties agree that in order to justify jury 
instructions on the defense of compulsion, criminal defendants must 
establish a reasonable basis in the evidence to support the 
instructions. See State v. Harding. 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981). 
See also opening brief of Appellant at 10 n.4 (same); brief of 
Appellee at 5-6 (same). 
The sole issue in dispute before this Court is whether or 
not Mr. Roberts is now entitled to muster the evidence of compulsion 
in the trial court in an effort to justify giving an instruction on 
the compulsion defense to a jury. 
ARGUMENT 
The State argues that Mr. Roberts is not entitled to 
present a compulsion defense at all because defense counsel failed 
to establish in the trial court the Lovercamp conditions on the 
compulsion defense1 discussed in State v. Tuttle. 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 
1986). Brief of Appellee at 13 through 14. 
A. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THIS CASE IS KEY TO 
UNDERSTANDING WHY MR. ROBERTS MUST BE GIVEN A 
MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH THE 
COMPULSION DEFENSE IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
The first and most important procedural consideration is 
that defense counsel has never had full access to the evidence 
necessary to formulate Mr. Roberts' compulsion defense. Corrections 
did not voluntarily produce necessary information in response to 
defense counsel's discovery motions (T. 12-13), and the trial court 
1. The conditions set forth in People v. Lovercamp, 43 
Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1974), are: 
(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific 
threat of death, forcible sexual attack or 
substantial bodily injury in the immediate future; 
(2) There is no time for a complaint to the 
authorities or there exists a history of futile 
complaints which make any result from such 
complaints illusory; 
(3) There is no time or opportunity to 
resort to the courts; 
(4) There is no evidence of force or 
violence used towards prison personnel or other 
"innocent" persons in the escape; and 
(5) The prisoner immediately reports to the 
proper authorities when he has attained a 
position of safety from the immediate threat. 
118 Cal. Rptr. at 115. 
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quashed the subpoenas for the testimony of Corrections employees and 
the subpoena duces tecum for the records concerning Corrections' 
investigation of the aggravated assault and kidnapping (T. 20). 
The second procedural consideration of importance is that 
defense counsel had no notice that the viability of the compulsion 
defense was going to be argued prior to the hearing wherein the 
trial court ruled the defense unavailable as a matter of law. 
Counsel for Corrections initiated that hearing and designated it as 
a hearing on Corrections' motion to quash the subpoenas served on 
Corrections employees, which motion argued that the subpoenas were 
not personally served and that the subpoenas were not served in a 
timely manner (R. 22-32). The parties had discussed the compulsion 
defense for months prior to this hearing without any dispute as to 
the legal viability of the defense (T. 21). It was only after the 
prosecutor interjected the opinion that Mr. Roberts should not be 
able to "put on his little circus act in front of the jury" (T. 7-8) 
that the viability of the defense became disputed. 
The parties and the trial court never discussed Lovercamp 
or Tuttle, or whether those prison escape cases were applicable to 
this prison aggravated assault and kidnapping case. The parties and 
the trial court never discussed whether the Tuttle case, approving a 
jury instruction in a prison escape compulsion case, can be applied 
to preclude Mr. Roberts from mustering and presenting such a defense 
at all. 
Corrections has never opposed Mr. Roberts' presentation of 
his defense. At the hearing on the motion to quash the subpoenas, 
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counsel for Corrections indicated that the Department of Corrections 
had no intent to "harass or delay" Mr. Roberts' defense, but merely 
wanted personal and timely service of the subpoenas on Corrections 
employees (T. 3). 
B. THE LEGAL AUTHORITIES DISCUSSED BY THE STATE 
MUST BE INTERPRETED TO AFFORD MR. ROBERTS DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW. 
On appeal, it is the State's contention that because 
counsel for Mr. Roberts failed to articulate sufficient evidence to 
justify a jury instruction on the compulsion defense at the hearing 
on the motion to quash the subpoenas, before defense counsel had 
access to all of the evidence necessary to the defense, Mr. Roberts 
is not entitled to present a compulsion defense to a jury as a 
matter of law. Brief of Appellee at 6-15. The majority of cases 
the State relies on to support this position are inapposite to the 
instant case because they involve criminal defendants who were 
allowed to muster the evidence of their defenses in the trial court 
before a jury, and who later raised issues on appeal concerning jury 
instructions on the defenses.2 
2. See People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. 
Rptr. 110, 116 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1974) (trial court should have 
given jury instruction on compulsion defense); State v. Harding, 635 
P.2d 33, 36 (Utah 1981) (trial court had no obligation to instruct 
on compulsion defense); State v. Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 
1979) (trial court had no obligation to instruct on criminal 
trespass); State v. Kearns. 219 S.E.2d 228, 231 (N.C. App. 1975) 
(trial court had no obligation to instruct on coercion defense); 
State v. Lamar, 698 P.2d 735, 742 (Ariz. App. 1984) (trial court had 
no obligation to instruct on duress); State v. Tuttle. 730 P.2d 630, 
(footnote continued) 
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State v. Pichon. 811 P.2d 517 (Kan. App. 1991), discussed 
at page 10 of the State's brief, is distinguishable from the instant 
case. Pichon is an escape case, which turned on the defendant's 
inability to show the fifth Lovercamp condition, that the defendant 
reported to authorities upon obtaining safety from the threat 
causing the escape. Id. at 523. Because Mr. Roberts' case is a 
prison aggravated assault and kidnapping case, and not an escape 
case, the fifth Lovercamp condition does not apply to Mr. Roberts' 
defense. Cf. State v. Little. 312 S.E.2d 695, 699 (N.C. App.), 
review denied. 317 S.E.2d 915 (1984); opening brief of Appellant at 
9 n.3; brief of Appellee at 14. 
United States v. Campbell. 609 F.2d 922 (8th Cir. 1979), 
discussed at pages 6 and 12 of the State's brief, is also 
distinguishable from the instant case, because the defendants in 
Campbell were at least allowed to present evidence in support of the 
compulsion defense to escape charges before one trial court refused 
to instruct on the defense and the other trial court struck the 
evidence that had been presented because it was insufficient to 
(footnote 2 continued) 
632-635 (Utah 1986) (jury instruction on duress was proper); 
State v. Watts. 298 S.E.2d 436, 437 (N.C. App. 1982) (trial court 
had no obligation to instruct on duress). 
In United States v. Ortiz. 804 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1986), 
the appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the 
defendant's request to submit an entrapment defense for the jury's 
consideration. Id. at 1163. It appears that the trial court heard 
all evidence available prior to making this ruling, as is a standard 
procedure in entrapment cases. Id. at 1166. 
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support the defense. Id. at 924.3 In the instant case, the trial 
court barred Mr. Roberts from presenting the defense before defense 
counsel, let alone the trial court, had access to the evidence 
necessary to the defense. 
The only case the State relies on that is procedurally 
analogous to this case is State v. Little, 312 S.E.2d 695 (N.C. 
App.), review denied, 317 S.E.2d 915 (1984), discussed at pages 10 
through 12 of the State's brief. In Little, as in this case, 
subpoenas necessary to the compulsion defense were quashed, no jury 
was ever selected, and the trial court ruled the compulsion defense 
unavailable as a matter of law. Id. at 697. As is discussed at 
pages 9 and 10 of Mr. Roberts' opening brief, Little is 
distinguishable from this case, because the "compulsion" defense and 
subpoenas in Little generally complained of the entire prison system 
and all prison conditions. The Little court explained, 
The "defendants' subpoena seeking records of the 
Department of Corrections relating to the 
defense" required the production of all records 
concerning weapons found and/or confiscated, 
incident reports concerning assaults on inmates 
by other inmates, and records containing 
complaints by inmates of emotional or mental 
problems related to abuse or injury suffered by 
3. In Campbell, the appellate court upheld the trial 
courts' refusal to produce witnesses to support the defendants' 
testimony concerning the compulsion defense. The affidavits 
supporting the motions to produce the witnesses were insufficient 
because they showed that the witnesses requested could not provide 
sufficient testimony to justify the compulsion defense. Id. at 
925. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 14, governing the issuance of 
the subpoenas at issue in this case, makes no requirement that 
counsel proffer the evidence anticipated from the subpoenaed 
witnesses and documents. 
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those inmates as a result of actions of other 
inmates. Yet, at the hearing on the State's 
motion to quash defendants' subpoena, the 
defendants presented no evidence to establish 
their personal connection with the incidents in 
the subpoenaed records. None of the defendants 
testified at the hearing. And the prison 
officials called by the defendants to testify 
about the records they maintained were not asked 
if the defendants themselves had made any 
complaints. 
Id. at 698. 
In contrast, Mr. Roberts' subpoenas sought information 
about the records, events and people directly relating to 
Mr. Roberts and the crimes at issue in this case (T. 14-18). It is 
the intention of defense counsel to properly serve the subpoenas and 
then to cull from this information the specific and imminent threats 
compelling Mr. Roberts at the time of the aggravated assault and 
kidnapping. 
The State argues that counsel for Mr. Roberts failed to 
show Lovercamp conditions (1) and (3), "that he was coerced by the 
use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him 
or a third person," and "that he did not have time or opportunity to 
resort to the courts." Brief of Appellee at 13-14. 
There are three reasons defense counsel's arguments 
concerning the defense do not parrot Lovercamp. First, the 
Lovercamp conditions approved by this Court in Tuttle as elements of 
a compulsion jury instruction in a prison escape case are not 
naturally applied to block the preparation and presentation of a 
compulsion defense in this prison aggravated assault and kidnapping 
case. Second, the parties and trial court in this case were not 
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discussing Lovercamp or Tuttle at the hearing on the motion to quash 
the subpoenas. Third, defense counsel had no notice that 
Mr. Roberts' rights to present his defense would be argued in the 
hearing on Corrections' motion to quash the subpoenas, which motion 
was based on the lack of personal service and the untimeliness of 
the subpoenas. 
Even if the State had given defense counsel sufficient 
notice that Mr. Roberts' entire defense was at stake, and assuming 
that the Lovercamp/Tuttle jury instruction elements could properly 
apply to completely block a compulsion defense in a prison 
aggravated assault and kidnapping case, because defense counsel had 
not had access to Corrections' evidence necessary to Mr. Roberts' 
defense, defense counsel was in no position to articulate the 
defense. 
Further, it appears that this Court has not adopted 
Lovercamp condition (3), concerning a lack of opportunity to resort 
to the courts. The jury instruction approved in Tuttle contained no 
such factor. State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630, 632 n.3 (Utah 1986). 
It seems that factor (3), concerning a lack of opportunity to resort 
to the courts, is implicit in and would be found in any case 
involving factors (1) and/or (2), concerning a specific and imminent 
threat, and a lack of opportunity for complaint or a history of 
futile complaints to authorities. 
In sum, all of the cases relied on by the State must be 
applied in the procedural context of this case to afford Mr. Roberts 
an opportunity to muster all evidence necessary to his defense. 
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Counsel for Mr. Roberts should be allowed to garner all relevant 
evidence after the proper service of the subpoenas for the testimony 
of Corrections officials involved with Mr. Roberts and after proper 
service of the subpoena duces tecum for the records of the Inspector 
General's investigation of the kidnapping and assault. Opening 
brief of Appellant at 7-11. Only in these circumstances will 
Mr. Roberts have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 
defense, as is required by due process of law. E.g. Crane v. 
Kentucky; State v. Harding, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order barring 
the presentation of Mr. Roberts' compulsion defense, and remand this 
case to the trial court so that defense counsel can obtain and 
muster all relevant evidence in support of Mr. Roberts' defense. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this # & day of January, 1992. 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Mr.^Roberts 
ELIZABETH' 
Attorney for 
OOK 
Mir. Roberts 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, hereby certify that ten copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this I3JJL day of January, 1992. 
DELIVERED by 
this day of January, 1992. 
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APPENDIX 1 
TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 14, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 
Rule 14. Subpoena. 
(a) A subpoena to require the attendance of 
a witness or interpreter before a court, 
magistrate or grand jury in connection with a 
criminal investigation or prosecution may be 
issued by the magistrate with whom an information 
is filed, the county attorney on his own 
initiative or upon the direction of the grand 
jury, or the court in which an information or 
indictment is to be tried. The clerk of the 
court in which a case is pending shall issue in 
blank to the defendant, without charge, as many 
signed subpoenas as the defendant may require. 
(b) A subpoena may command the person to 
whom it is directed to appear and testify or to 
produce in court or to allow inspection of 
records, papers or other objects. The court may 
quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would 
be unreasonable. 
(c) A subpoena may be served by any person 
over the age of 18 years who is not a party. 
Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the 
subpoena to the witness or interpreter personally 
and notifying him of the contents. A peace 
officer shall serve any subpoena delivered to him 
for service in his county. 
(d) Written return of service of a subpoena 
shall be made promptly to the court and to the 
person requesting that the subpoena be served, 
stating the time and place of service and by whom 
service was made. 
(e) A subpoena may compel the attendance of 
a witness from anywhere in the state. 
(f) When a person required as a witness is 
in custody within the state, the court may order 
the officer having custody of the witness to 
bring him before the court. 
(g) Failure to obey a subpoena without 
reasonable excuse may be deemed a contempt of the 
court responsible for its issuance. 
(h) Whenever a material witness is about to 
leave the state, or is so ill or infirm as to 
afford reasonable grounds for believing that he 
will be unable to attend a trial or hearing, 
either party may, upon notice to the other, apply 
to the court for an order that the witness be 
examined conditionally by deposition. Attendance 
of the witness at the deposition may be compelled 
by subpoena. The defendant shall be present at 
the deposition and the court shall make whatever 
order is necessary to effect such attendance. 
